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Airport Capacity Allocation with Network Airlines
Airport Capacity Allocation with Network Airlines

Airport Capacity Allocation with Network Airlines

CFAC - The Aviation Series

293 Pages, 6 x 8.75

Formats: Trade Paper

Trade Paper, $82.00 (US $82.00)

Publication Date: January 2017

ISBN 9783037518748

Rights: US & CA

Dike Publishers (Jan 2017)

Price: $82.00
 
 

Overview

This study provides a theoretical framework to investigate the efficiency of different airport capacity allocation schemes under congestion externalities and imperfect competition. The book's innovation is in considering an asymmetric market structure featuring a single dominant network carrier at its hub airport that endogenously differentiates its flights based on passenger benefits from network density. Based on a partial equilibrium analysis of the generic model, the investigation qualitatively evaluates the ambiguities on allocation efficiency, which arise with capacity allocation in a market that faces multiple distortions. In addition, a quantitative simulation comprehensively illustrates the market structures of the model, as well as selected outcomes concerning the allocation instruments. At the end, a brief summary helps to quickly access the main lessons of this extensive investigation; moreover, the conclusions are extended into implications for practice, which will be interesting for regulators, policymakers, and airline managers alike. This book constitutes a revised version of the author's original PhD thesis. As an excerpt, the generic model and the theoretical results were awarded the annual Prize in European Aviation Economics and Management at the European Aviation Conference 2016 by the German Aviation Research Society (GARS). Dissertation. (Series: CFAC - The Aviation Series, Vol. 12) [Subject: Aviation Management]